



Rejection of kAraNa-tva as per KhanDana-khanDa-khAdya



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24th August 2025





यत्साक्षात्सच्चिदानन्दं प्रत्यगद्वयमक्रियम् ।
तन्नमामि नृसिंहस्य योगिगम्यं परं पदम् ॥

Table of contents

S. No.	Topic	Pages
1	Introduction	4
2	Definitions of kAraNa-tva proposed by NyAya	4-15
2.1	पूर्वभावित्वं कारणत्वम्	4-8
2.2	व्यापारवत्त्वं कारणत्वम्	8
2.3	नित्य-सत्त्व-असत्त्वयोः -अन्यतर-प्रसक्ति-निवारकत्वं कारणत्वम्	8-9
2.4	यत्-अनभ्युपगमे यस्य तत्पूर्व-सत्त्व-प्रसङ्गः, तत् तस्य कारणम्	9-10
2.5	नियत-प्राग्भावित्वं कारणत्वम्	10-12
2.6	सामग्री-एकदेशत्वं कारणत्वम्	12
2.7	कार्य-कारण-भाव-सम्बन्ध-अधिकरणत्वं कारणत्वम्	12-13
2.8	कारण-गत-धर्म-विशेषः कारणत्वम्	13-15
3	Further arguments to reject pratyaksha of kAraNa-tva	15
4	Is kAraNa-tva nitya or anitya	16
5	kAraNa-tva in all kAraNa?	16
6	Is there any kAraNa of a kArya-vishesha?	16-18

Rejection of kAraNa-tva as per KhanDana-khanDa-khAdya

Introduction

It is a pivotal concept of advaita vedAnta that anything which is seen, is mithyA. One of the two meanings of the word “mithyA” is anirvachanIyatA. PanchapAdikA says - मिथ्याशब्दो द्वयर्थः अपहववचनोऽनिर्वचनीयतावचनश्च. Further, it says - मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः इति । मिथ्या च तदज्ञानं च मिथ्याज्ञानम् । मिथ्येति अनिर्वचनीयता उच्यते ।

Thus, basically, advaita vedAnta holds that the seen is mithyA and is hence anirvachanIya. The word anirvachanIya implies that it cannot be described as either sat or asat. Since kAraNa-tva is seen, as per advaita vedAnta, it is anirvachanIya.

However, as per NyAya, kAraNa-tva is not anirvachanIya.

Definitions proposed by NyAya

2. To refute this position of NyAya, KhanDana-khanDa-khAdya takes up eight possible definitions of kAraNa-tva and refutes them all. It also ends the discussion by saying that any further definition of kAraNa-tva can similarly be refuted. The eight definitions discussed are as under:

1. पूर्वभावित्वम्
2. व्यापारवत्त्वं कारणत्वम्
3. नित्य-सत्त्व-असत्त्वयोः अन्यतर-प्रसक्ति-निवारकत्वम्
4. यत्-अनभ्युपगमे यस्य तत्पूर्व-सत्त्व-प्रसङ्गः, तत् तस्य कारणम्
5. नियत-प्राग्भावित्वं कारणत्वम्
6. सामग्रेकदेशत्वं कारणत्वम्
7. कार्यकारणभावसम्बन्ध-अधिकरणत्वं कारणत्वम्
8. कारणगतधर्मविशेषः कारणत्वम्

We will take up each definition and its refutation sequentially.

2.1 पूर्वभावित्वम्

2.1.1 Opponent: Let kAraNa-tva be defined as pUrva-bhAvi-tva. That is, anything which exists prior to kArya can be termed as kAraNa.

Refutation: It would imply that things which have been long destroyed before even the production of kArya can be termed as kAraNa, which is clearly not accepted as such objects have no relationship with kArya.

2.1.2 Opponent: Let the definition पूर्वभावित्वम् be modified to be कार्य-अव्यवहित-पूर्वभावित्वम्.

Refutation: The modified definition means that kAraNa has to exist prior to kArya and there should be no vyavadhAna (distance/interruption) between kArya and kAraNa. However, as per Shruti “यजेत स्वर्गकामः”, yAga is kAraNa of swarga. But, there is vyavadhAna between yAga and swarga. It is only the adrishTa/apUrva which has कार्य-अव्यवहित-पूर्वभावित्वम्, and hence as per the modified definition, only adrishTa/apUrva can have kAraNa-tva, which is clearly not the case.

Opponent: Though prima facie it appears that adrishTa is a vyavadhAna between yAga and swarga, on closer scrutiny, it is not so. Actually, adrishTa is a vyApAra of yAga. And there is no vyavadhAna by vyApAra to vyApArI. Hence, yAga will retain the kAraNa-tva.

Refutation: If so, then even the father-of-pot-maker will become the kAraNa of pot. If despite adrishTa being present between yAga and swarga, yAga retains the kAraNa-tva, then despite pot-maker being present between father-of-pot-maker and pot, father-of-pot-maker will retain the kAraNa-tva.

Opponent: We said that vyApAra is not a vyavadhAna. Since pot-maker is not a vyApAra of father-of-pot-maker, the pot-maker will serve as vyavadhAna and hence father-of-pot-maker will not have kAraNatva.

Refutation: Just as adrishTa is born from yAga, and adrishTa gives birth to swarga, similarly, pot-maker is born from father-of-pot-maker, and pot-maker gives birth to pot. So, where exactly is the distinction? A clear distinction needs to be brought out.

Opponent: We can explain vyApAra as “यद्विना यद्यन्न जनयति, तत् तस्य-अवान्तर-व्यापारः”. Since yAga cannot give rise to swarga without adrishTa, it can be held to be vyApAra. But father-of-pot-maker can give rise to pot without pot-maker. Hence, pot-maker is not a vyApAra.

Refutation: But then even the sahaKArI-kAraNa such as the wheel will become the vyApAra of the stick as the stick cannot give birth to the pot without the wheel. However, none accepts wheel as vyApAra of danDa. Rather, the wheel is accepted by everyone as sahaKAri-kAraNa.

Opponent: Let then the vyApAra be born from the entity which is postulated as kAraNa. So, if x is postulated to be the kAraNa of y, and z is stated to be the vyApAra, then we say that z should be born from x and x cannot give rise to y without z.

Refutation: What exactly is meant by “being born”? Janya-tva is nothing but kAraNa-tva in different words. So, unless kAraNa-tva is established, janya-tva cannot be brought in. Since kAraNa-tva is so far not established, explaining vyApAra on the basis of janya-tva, which is another name for kAraNa-tva, is not permissible. Thus, it is clear that no specific description is provided for vyApAra. And hence, कार्य-अव्यवहित-पूर्वभावित्वम् is not acceptable.

And even if by some means, some specific description of vyApAra is provided, still space, time etc will have कार्य-अव्यवहित-पूर्वभावित्वम् with respect to all kArya. And hence, they will possess kAraNa-tva. That is not accepted.

2.1.3 Opponent: Let then kAraNa-tva be defined as अन्यथासिद्ध-पूर्वभावित्वम्. That means, kAraNa-tva would be in the entity which not only exists prior to kArya but is not अन्यथासिद्ध either. Since space, time etc are अन्यथासिद्ध, despite them having पूर्वभावित्वम्, they will not have kAraNa-tvam.

Refutation: What exactly is the meaning of अन्यथासिद्ध? The word anyathA refers to अन्य-प्रकारेण and siddhi refers to वर्तमानता. When you use the word अन्यथासिद्ध, you need to explain that अन्य-प्रकार is with respect to what? Thus, by the word अन्यथासिद्ध, what exactly do you mean?

- 1) कार्यात्-अन्येन-प्रकारेण कारणस्य न निष्पत्तिः (उत्पत्तिः)
- 2) कार्यात्-अन्येन-प्रकारेण कारणस्य न ज्ञप्तिः
- 3) कारणत्वात्-अन्येन-प्रकारेण कारणस्य न निष्पत्तिः
- 4) कारणत्वात्-अन्येन-प्रकारेण कारणस्य न ज्ञप्तिः

None of these are valid. These basically mean the following:

- 1) कार्यात् (एव) कारणस्य निष्पत्तिः (उत्पत्तिः)

- 2) कार्यात् (एव) कारणस्य न ज्ञप्तिः
- 3) कारणत्वात् (एव) कारणस्य निष्पत्तिः
- 4) कारणत्वात् (एव) कारणस्य ज्ञप्तिः

Now, (1) it is never the case that kAraNa is born from kArya. (2) Nor is the case that kAraNa (clay) is known only through kArya (pot). kAraNa can be known through pratyaksha of itself also. (3) results in AtmAshraya-dOsha. (4) is invalid because kAraNa, danDa, can be known through danDa-tva also and not necessarily through kAraNa-tva.

Hence, none of the alternatives are valid and are hence rejected.

Opponent: Let the word “अन्य” within the word “अन्य-प्रकारेण” i.e. अन्यथा, be defined as व्यतिरिक्तत्वम्. So, अनन्यथासिद्ध would basically mean kAraNa would be असिद्ध i.e. अज्ञात if it is व्यतिरिक्त. In the present context, व्यतिरिक्तत्वम् refers to अकारणत्वम्. This basically means that kAraNa is something which is never known as non-kAraNa i.e. अकारणत्वेन अज्ञात. Thus, the definition of kAraNa-tva, अनन्यथासिद्ध-पूर्वभावित्वम्, would basically mean अकारणत्वेन अज्ञातत्वे सति पूर्वभावित्वं कारणत्वम्.

Refutation: This definition too uses the concept of kAraNa-tva. And is hence defective on account of AtmAshraya-dOsha.

Further, such kAraNa-tva can arise in danDa only after the pot is born. However, prior thereto, the danDa is known as qualified with danDa-tva and not kAraNa-tva. Thus, the danDa is अकारणत्वेन ज्ञात. Hence, there is avyApti in danDa prior to the birth of the pot. Thus, the definition अनन्यथासिद्ध-पूर्वभावित्वम् is invalid even after the improvisation.

Opponent: That can be explained. If kAraNa-tva is present even for one moment, then it is always a kAraNa. So, if x has अव्यवहित-पूर्वक्षणवृत्तित्व, then it will possess kAraNatva in the moments prior thereto as well. Thus, basically, kAraNa-tva is कार्य-अव्यवहित-पूर्वक्षण-असम्बन्ध-अनधिकरणत्वम्. Since, once x has अव्यवहित-पूर्वक्षणवृत्तित्व, then it will never have sambandh-anadhikaraNatvam. That means, it will always have asambandha-anadhikaraNatvam. Hence, it will always have kAraNa-tva.

Refutation: But there are some entities which never have अव्यवहित-पूर्वक्षणवृत्तित्व because they are destroyed the moment they are born. How in case of such objects, can there be the attribution of kAraNa-tva? For e.g. some kapAla or some tantu get destroyed without producing their effect. How can they be spoken as kAraNa?

Opponent: That can be explained by attributing kAraNa-tva to all entities which have the same jAti as that of kAraNa. So, if x satisfies the definition of kAraNa, then entities having the same jAti will possess kAraNa-tva. Thus, even if some particular tantu does not strictly satisfy the condition of kAraNa-tva, on account of being of the same jAti as the kAraNa-tantu, they can be stated as kAraNa.

Refutation: In that case, space etc would be the kAraNa with respect to all kArya as it will not be anyathA-siddha. Since space has kAraNa-tva vis-a-vis shabda, it will retain kAraNa-tva with respect to all kArya such as pot etc. And if one prefers to hold that space is anyathA-siddha with respect to the pot, then it will remain so even with respect to shabda. And thus, the kAraNa-tva of space vis-a-vis shabda will be violated. Thus, there is clear incongruity.

Therefore, it is proved that neither पूर्वभावित्वम्, nor कार्य-अव्यवहित-पूर्वभावित्वम् nor अनन्यथासिद्ध-पूर्वभावित्वम् is a valid lakshaNa of kAraNa-tva.

2.2 व्यापारवत्त्वं कारणत्वम्

Opponent: kAraNa-tva can be alternatively defined as vyApAra-vattva i.e. possession-hood-of-vyApAra.

Refutation: What exactly is meant by vyApAra-vattva? Does it mean vyApAra-samavAyi-tva or vyApAra-janaka-tva? That is to say, does it mean that vyApAra is present in kAraNa through samavAya-sambandha or through jankatA-sambandha (kAraNa is janaka of vyApAra)?

In the former case, there is vyabhichAra as adrishTa, born from kAraNa-yAga, is not located in yAga but in kartA. Thus, there is no samavAya with kAraNa.

In the latter case, there is AtmAshraya-dOsha as janka-tva is nothing but kAraNa-tva which is being deliberated.

Thus, the definition व्यापारवत्त्वं कारणत्वम् is proved to be invalid.

2.3 नित्य-सत्त्व-असत्त्वयोः-अन्यतर-प्रसक्ति-निवारकत्वं कारणत्वम्

Opponent: If there is no kAraNa of say pot, then pot will either be nitya-sat or nitya-asat. It is the kAraNa, such as wheel or danDa, which are the nivAraka (preventor) of the possibility of being eternally-existent or eternally-non-existent. These kAraNa bring about temporality in the effect.

Refutation: The word nivAraka is derived using नि with वृज् धातु. Grammatically, it refers to kartA, which is nothing but a specific kAraNa. Since it is kAraNa-tva which is being defined, there is AtmAshraya-dOsha in this definition.

Apart from this, even the word अन्यतर (one of the two) having अन्यतरत्व, which would be inherent in both nitya-sattva and nitya-asattva cannot be described either. [KKK does not explain it. Please refer to the commentary.]

2.4 यत्-अनभ्युपगमे यस्य तत्पूर्व-सत्त्व-प्रसङ्गः, तत् तस्य कारणम्

Opponent: If danDa is not held as the kAraNa of the pot, then there arises the possibility that there is existence of the pot even before its production. कारणस्य-अनभ्युपगमे कार्यस्य कार्य-उत्पत्ति-क्षणात्-पूर्वे सत्त्व-प्रसङ्गः. Therefore, danDa is the cause of the pot.

Refutation: There is ativyApti in pot-dhvamsa. None regards pot-dhvamsa as the cause of pot. However, as per the definition, pot-dhvamsa would amount to be the cause of pot. Let us see the mechanism. If pot-dhvamsa is not admitted, then pot will become without end i.e. ananta. Now, a bhAva padArtha which is ananta is also anAdi. Therefore, pot will be existent even before its creation because it is anAdi. And thus, pot-dhvamsa will become kAraNa. This is invalid. Hence, the definition adduced is incorrect.

Opponent: Let the definition be modified a bit. Let it be तत्-पूर्व-स्थितत्वे सति यत्-अनभ्युपगमे यस्य तत्पूर्व-सत्त्व-प्रसङ्गः, तत् तस्य कारणम्. Basically, we are adding a condition that kAraNa should exist prior to kArya. So, there will be no ativyApti in pot-dhvamsa.

Refutation: Let us take a situation where due to fire, rUpa, rasa, gandha and sparsha are born together in a pot. So, prior to a specific moment, there is rUpa-prAk-abhAva, rasa-prAk-abhAva, gandha-prAk-abhAva and sparsha-prAk-abhAva together. These four disappear together and rUpa, rasa, gandha, sparsha are born together.

Here, if we don't admit rUpa-prAk-abhAva, then it implies that rUpa is present before its creation (because there is no rUpa-prAk-abhAva). But since rUpa, rasa, gandha and sparsha are born together, it implies that rasa, gandha and sparsha will also be present before their creation. Thus, rUpa-prAk-abhAva is prior to rasa, gandha, sparsha and its non-acceptance leads to existence of rasa, gandha

and sparsha even before their creation. Hence, rUpa-prAk-abhAva will be the cause of rasa, sparsha and gandha, which is absurd. Therefore, the definition adduced is invalid.

2.5 नियत-प्राग्भावित्वं कारणत्वम्

Opponent: Let the definition of kAraNa-tva be नियत-प्राग्भावित्वं कारणत्वम्. That is to say, x is a kAraNa of y if by niyama, x has a prior-existence with respect to y.

Refutation: What exactly is the meaning of the word niyama. Does it mean अवश्यम्भाव or does it mean अनौपाधिकत्वम्?

If the word “niyama” means अवश्यम्भाव, then the definition basically means mandatory prior-existence. Now, space etc have a mandatory prior-existence vis-a-vis all kArya. So, they will become kAraNa of all kArya, which is invalid. Further, the rUpa-of-kapAla has mandatory prior-existence vis-a-vis the rasa-of-ghaTa. By this definition, rUpa-of-kapAla will become kAraNa for rasa-of-ghaTa, which is absurd. Hence, the meaning अवश्यम्भाव cannot be taken in the definition.

If the alternative meaning “अनौपाधिकत्वम्” is taken of the word “niyama”, then basically the definition of kAraNa-tva becomes अनौपाधिक-पूर्वभावत्वं कारणत्वम्. This basically means that if x has prior-existence vis-a-vis y not on account of some upAdhi, but naturally, without any external condition, then x is a cause of y. However, this definition has vyabhichAra.

Let us take the example of ants carrying their eggs from lower place to higher place. This is followed by rain. If we taken the definition of kAraNa-tva as अनौपाधिक-पूर्वभावत्वं कारणत्वम्, then ants-moving-eggs will become the cause for rain, which is absurd. Hence, the definition fails.

Opponent: It is not a rule that whenever rain happens, there is ants-moving-eggs prior thereto. The contrary is however correct. Therefore, rain has पर-भाव vis-a-vis ants-carrying-eggs, but ants-carrying-eggs doesn't have नियत-पूर्वभाव. So, there is no infirmity in the definition.

Refutation: In Ayurveda, there is a famous shLOka -

निदानं पूर्वरूपाणि रूपाण्युपशयस्तथा। सम्प्राप्तिश्चेति विज्ञानं रोगाणां पञ्चधास्मृतम्॥

Here, the meanings of the words are as under:

निदानं = cause of disease.

पूर्वरूप = unmanifest prior form of disease (premonitory symptoms).

रूपाणि = clear symptoms of disease.

उपशय = appropriate cure of the disease.

सम्प्राप्तिः = consequence of dOshAs such as vAta etc.

If we take the definition of kAraNa-tva as अनौपाधिक-पूर्वभावत्वम्, then it would imply that even पूर्वरूप is kAraNa, which is incorrect. Only निदान is accepted as kAraNa.

Further, it needs to be explained as to what exactly is the meaning of the word पूर्व in यत्-अनभ्युपगमे यस्य तत्पूर्व-सत्त्व-प्रसङ्गः.

Opponent: Let the word पूर्व means पूर्व-काल-सम्बन्धित्वम्!

Refutation: This would imply that there is avyApti in kAla, because kAla cannot have a sambandha with kAla itself on account of being singular. Further, what exactly is pUrva-tva in pUrva-kAla, that also needs explanation.

Opponent: Though kAla is singular, yet owing to the upAdhi namely the motion-of-sun, the distinctions in kAla are admitted. Owing to the said upAdhi, there are bheda in kAla such as ateeta etc. So, when upAdhi is activity-of-sun-in-the-ateeta, then such upAdhi-vishishTa-kAla is called pUrva-kAla. Thus, pUrva-tva basically means “अतीत-उपाधि-अवच्छिन्नत्वम्”.

Refutation: This leads to AtmAshraya-dOsha as the description of the upAdhi “ateeta” requires pUrva-tva.

Opponent: There are two guNAs, परत्व and अपरत्व. Here, the guNa named परत्व is what is meant by pUrva-tva.

Refutation: This is not correct because this परत्व guNa is accepted only in mUrta-dravya. Since kAla is not a mUrta-dravya, it cannot have परत्व and hence kAla cannot be kAraNa.

Further, there can be no guNa in guNa. Hence, परत्व guNa cannot be in परत्व itself. Thus, परत्व cannot be kAraNa. If you hold that it does not matter if परत्व is not a kAraNa, then that is not correct because परत्व has to be a kAraNa with respect to

knowledge-of-परत्व (vishaya is a kAraNa in vishaya-vishayaka-jnAna). Therefore, it is proved that pUrva-tva has not been defined.

2.6 सामग्री-एकदेशत्वं कारणत्वम्

Opponent: Just as a unit of forest is a tree, similarly sAmgrI is defined as a group of kAraNa. And kAraNa is basically a unit of sAmgrI. Therefore, सामग्री-एकदेशत्वम् can be the definition of kAraNa-tva.

Refutation: Not so. Because eka-deshatva of sAmagrI itself is anirvachanIya. This is because sAmagrI is not accepted in ArambhavAda as an avayavI-dravya. sAmagrI is niravayava as well as devoid of pradesha-tva. Hence, defining kAraNa-tva as sAmagrI-eka-deshatvam is invalid. [सामग्र्येकदेशत्वं कारणत्वमिति चेन्न, एकदेशत्वस्यानिर्वचनीयत्वात्। अवयवत्व-प्रदेशत्वादीनां सामग्र्यामसम्भवात्।]

Further, there is anyOnyAshraya-dOsha as well. sAmgrI is being defined as a conglomerate of all kAraNa. And kAraNa is being defined as a unit of sAmagrI. Thus, sAmagrI requires kAraNa for its definition and kAraNa requires sAmagrI for its definition. Thus, there is anyOnyAshraya-dOsha. [सकलकारणकलापसमवधानस्यैव च मेलकार्थत्वात् तेनैव तन्निर्वचनीयत्वात्।]

Opponent: There is no anyOnyAshraya-dOsha. Because in order to define sAmagrI, we do not need kAraNa. sAmagrI is actually defined as - यदनन्तरं कार्यं भवत्येव, सा सामग्रोति. If kArya mandatorily comes after x, then x is called sAmagrI. Here, in this definition of sAmagrI, there is no requirement of kAraNa. Hence, there is no anyOnyAshraya-dOsha.

Refutation: Not so. This definition has ati-vyApti in vibhAga. After vibhAga, there is mandatory samyga-nAsha. By your definition, vibhAga will become the sAmagrI of samyOga-nAsha. That is invalid. Because there are several other kAraNAs such as adrishTa etc. Only vibhAga cannot be sAmagrI. It can be a kAraNa but not kAraNa-samUha.

Thus, defining kAraNa-tva as sAmagrI-eka-deshatvam is invalid.

2.7 कार्य-कारण-भाव-सम्बन्ध-अधिकरणत्वं कारणत्वम्

Opponent: kAraNa-tva can be defined as the adhikaraNa-tva of kArya-kAraNa-bhAva which is a sambandha. Thus, kAraNa-tva is basically the AdhAra, the locus, where kArya-kAraNa-bhAva-sambandha resides.

Refutation: Not so. If we take the bhUtala-ghaTa-samyOga-sambandha, then it is located in bhUtala as well as ghaTa. Similarly, since kArya-kAraNa-bhAva is a sambandha, it is located in both kArya as well as kAraNa. If the locus is stated to be kAraNa-tva, then kArya-tva and kAraNa-tva will become identical, which is undesirable. [कार्यकारणभावो नाम सम्बन्धः कोऽपीति चेत्, न, तदाऽविशेषेण कार्यकारणसाङ्कर्यापत्तेः ।]

If you argue that kAraNa-tvam is kArya-sambandhitvam and kArya-tvam is kAraNa-sambandhitvam, then there is anyOnyAshraya-dOsha as is evident.

2.8 कारण-गत-धर्म-विशेषः कारणत्वम्

Opponent: kAraNa-tva is a well-known dharma. It does not require any specific description of definition. It is basically a dharma which is located in kAraNa. This description is enough.

Refutation: Not so. You need to provide a pramANa in order to establish the existence of kAraNa-tva. [कारणत्वं धर्मः कोऽपीति चेन्न, तत्सद्भावे प्रमाणस्य वाच्यत्वात् ।]

Opponent: The kAraNa can be either pratyaksha or non-pratyaksha. The kAraNa-tva which is present in pratyaksha-kAraNa, such as danDa, is known through pratyaksha. The kAraNa-tva, which is present in non-pratyaksha-kAraNa, such as adrishTa, is known through anumAna.

Refutation: Not so. Let us take first the kAraNa-tva which is claimed to be known through pratyaksha-pramANa. How exactly is it known?

Is it known:

1. Without being qualified by kArya (कार्य-अविशेषित-कारणत्व)
2. Qualified with kArya (कार्य-विशेषित-कारणत्व)
 - a. (कार्य-सामान्य-विशेषित-कारणत्व)
 - b. (कार्य-विशेष-विशेषित-कारणत्व)

The question therefore is whether the kAraNatva in danDa, claimed to be known through pratyaksha, is known without being qualified by kArya or as qualified by kArya. So, whether kAraNa-tva in danDa is known as “कारणत्वम् अत्र” or “घटस्य कारणत्वम् अत्र”? It is well known that mere kAraNa-tva in danDa is not known at all. It is always qualified with kArya. [So, 1 is rejected]

Further, this kArya-visheshita-kAraNatva has sAmAnyA-kArya as the qualifier or vishesha-kArya. That is, whether ghaTa-sAmAnyA appears as the

qualifier or ghaTa-vishesha. If you say ghaTa-sAmAnyā acts as the qualifier of kAraNa-tva (2(a)), then you will need to answer as to how from the kAraNa-of-ghaTa-sAmAnyā, there is birth of ghaTa-vishesha. If you say that ghaTa-sAmAnyā encompasses all ghaTa-vishesha, then how would you explain the clear assertion in loka - “that specific danDa is the cause of that specific ghaTa”. [तद्वण्डव्यक्तिः एव तद्वटव्यक्तेः कारणम्]. Thus, 2(a) is rejected.

If you say that kAraNa-tva is known as qualified with kArya-vishesha, then there can be no pratyaksha of kAraNa-tva prior to production of kArya, as kArya would not be available to be acted upon as a qualifier. This is against the experience in loka. Thus, 2(b) is rejected.

Now, since pratyaksha of kAraNa-tva is not possible, there can be no vyApti-jnAna either. And hence, anumAna is not possible either.

Thus, the statement that kAraNa-tva is known through pratyaksha in pratyaksha-kAraNa, and through anumAna in apratyaksha-kAraNa is refuted.

Opponent: How then do you advocate Brahman as the cause of the world? And how do you engage in discussions to teach others, and how do you engage in drinking water to remove thirst?

Refutation: These are no defects as we advocate anirvachanIyatA of kAraNa-tva. [Since we hold kAraNa-tva and kArya-kAraNa-sambandha as anirvachanIya and illusory, the engagement in drinking water to remove thirst can be explained on the basis of dream analogy. Causality of Brahman is also from avidyA-drishTi only and not pAramArthika-drishTi.]

Opponent: Let kAraNa-tva be not admitted through pratyaksha or anumAna. We hold that kAraNa-tva can be known through arthApatti. Here, upapAdya is kArya-gata-kAdAchitkatva, and upapAdaka is kAraNa-tva. [The arthApatti is employed as under: If there is kAraNa-tva-abhAva, then there would be kArya-gata-kAdAchitkatva-abhAva.]

Refutation: For a detailed note on arthApatti-pramA, please refer to <https://sudhanshushekhar.wordpress.com/2024/10/30/a-practical-guide-of-arthapatti-pramana/>. arthApatti-pramA i.e. upapAdaka-jnAna is basically a kalpanA, an imagination which is done on the basis of upapAdya-jnAna. तत्र उपपाद्यज्ञानेन उपपादककल्पनम् अर्थापत्तिः ।

If you say that upapAdya is kArya-gata-kAdAchitkatva (कार्य-गत-कादाचित्कत्व), and upapAdaka is kAraNa-tva, then it is not correct. Because upapAdya is in kArya and upapAdaka is in kAraNa and there is a vaiyadhikaraNya. [कादाचित्कत्वानुपपत्त्या तद्ग्रह इति चेन्न, वैयधिकरण्यात् ।]

If you somehow show sAmAnAdhikaraNya between kAdAchitka-tva and kAraNa-tva by arguing “a temporal kArya requires temporal kAraNa”, then also you will have to admit infinite regress in the form of kAraNa-kAraNa-tva, kAraNa-kAraNa-kAraNa-tva ad infinitum. You cannot employ seed-sprout analogy either as kArya-kAraNa-bhAva has not yet been established anywhere including seed-sprout.

Further, if you hold sAmAnAdhikaraNya between upapAdya and upapAdaka, then you need to answer as to whether you admit of a relationship between these two or not? If yes, then there has to be an additional sambandha of that sambandha, and this goes ad infinitum. If alternatively, you do not admit of a relationship between upapAdya and upapAdaka, then arthApatti cannot be adduced as an argument.

With refutation of arthApatti, the definition of cause as “something which has a shakti” (“adduced by MImAmsakas”) also stands refuted. This is so because shakti is imagined through arthApatti.

3. Further arguments to reject pratyaksha of kAraNa-tva

3.1 If one argues that kAraNa-tva is known through pratyaksha, then one has to admit that kAraNa-tva is also a kAraNa. This is because x is a vishaya in x-pratyaksha-jnAna. And vishaya has a kAraNa-tva with respect to vishaya-jnAna. So, kAraNa-tva is a kAraNa in kAraNa-tva-pratyaksha-jnAna (ghaTa is a kAraNa in ghata-jnAna). Now, if kAraNa-tva (1) is a kAraNa, then kAraNa-tva (1) would possess further kAraNa-tva (2). If kAraNa-tva (2) is identical to kAraNa-tva (1), then there is AtmAshraya-dOsha, or else there would be anyOnyAshraya, or chakraka or anavasthA-dOsha.

3.2 Further, if kAraNa-tva were to be known through pratyaksha, then there should have been no dispute about it. It is the nature of entities known through pratyaksha that there is no dispute with respect to them.

4. Is kAraNa-tva nitya or anitya

4.1 This kAraNa-tva can be either nitya or anitya. If it is nitya, then even prior to production of ghaTa, there should have been cognition “दण्डेन घटं करोति” as is the case after the production of ghaTa. But this is not so. Prior to the production of ghaTa, the cognition is simply “दण्डोऽस्ति”.

If it is held that kAraNa-tva is anitya, then prior to production of kAraNa-tva, there can be no possibility of accepting x as a kAraNa of y. If you say that even though kAraNa-tva is anitya, it is not born, then what is the need to accept that ghaTa etc, despite being anitya, are born. Let them also be unborn.

5. kAraNa-tva in all kAraNa?

5.1 It needs to be ascertained as to whether this kAraNa-tva present in kAraNa-1, kAraNa-2 etc is same dharma or different dharma.

If it is accepted that the dharma kAraNa-tva is identical in all kAraNa, then from kAraNa-1, there should be the possibility of birth of kArya-2. Since this is not possible, it cannot be admitted that kAraNa-tva dharma is identical in all kAraNa.

Opponent: Though kAraNa-tva is identical in all kAraNa, still it appears as different owing to the sambandha with different kArya. So, kArya-1-sambandha-vishishTa-kAraNatva is different from kArya-2-sambandha-vishishTa-kAraNatva.

Refutation: It has been shown that there is no evidence in admitting kAraNa-tva without being qualified by kArya. So, kArya-avisheshita-kAraNatva i.e. sAmAnyā-kAraNatva i.e. kAraNatva-tva-vishishTa-kAraNatva is inadmissible as the experience in loka is of “ghaTa-kAraNam, paTa-kAraNam etc”. If merely on the basis of kapAla being kAraNa of pot, you admit kAraNa-tva in kapAla, then on account of not being kAraNa of paTa, kapAla has akAraNa-tva dharma also. Thus, two mutual virOdhi dharma namely kAraNa-tva and akAraNa-tva will be present in kapAla, which is inadmissible.

6. Is there any kAraNa of a kArya-vishesha?

6.1 **Opponent:** There has to be a kAraNa of a kArya-vishesha. If kAraNa is not admitted, then that kArya-vishesha will either be like horns of a hare or it will be eternally existent. Since that is not what is seen in loka, one has to admit a kAraNa

of kArya-vishesha. If a vyakti-vishesha is kAraNa, then there has to be a dharma located in that vyakti-vishesha which is called kAraNa-tva.

Refutation: Fine. But then what exactly is the lakshaNa of that dharma named kAraNatva located in that vyakti-vishesha called kAraNa. Is it either of the following:

1. पूर्वभाव
2. स्वरूप
3. नियत पूर्वभावित्व
4. नियत-तज्जातीयत्वे सति तत्पूर्वत्व
5. नियत-तज्जातीयत्वे सति तत्-सादेश्यत्व

Now, **1 is inadmissible** because just as danDa-vyakti has pUrva-bhAva to ghaTa, similarly the donkey (on which clay was brought for making pot) also has pUrva-bhAva but is not considered to be cause. So, 1 has ativyApti in donkey.

2 is inadmissible because if the swarUpa of danDa-vyakti is kAraNa-tva, then the wheel cannot be kAraNa because the swarUpa of the wheel is different from danDa. However, the wheel is also accepted as a kAraNa by you. So, kAraNa-tva cannot be swarUpa of a kAraNa-vishesha.

3 also is inadmissible. The meaning of the word “niyata-tva” is vyApti. Now, vyApti requires anvaya-sahachAra and vyatireka-sahachAra. This is impossible in case of vyakti-vishesha. (This discussion is about kAraNa being vyakti-vishesha). You cannot argue that “नियत पूर्वभावित्व” be replaced by “तज्जातीयं प्रति नियत-तज्जातीयत्वं कारणत्वम्”. This is so because of the following. What you mean by this definition is as under - a ghaTa-vyakti has ghatatva jAti. Now, when ghaTatva-vishishTa-ghaTa-vyakti is born, then mrit-tva is also coupled with that. This mrit-tva is being posited by you as kAraNa-tva. However, this implies that all past, future, present clay is the cause because they all have mrit-tva and thus they have mrit-jAtIyatva-niyatatva. That is undesirable. [जात्यालिङ्गितत्वेन व्यक्तीनां नियतत्वसिद्धौ कारणत्वसिद्धिरिति शङ्कते तदिति । घटत्वजात्यालिङ्गितव्यव्युत्पत्तौ याऽनुगता मृत्त्वजातिस्तदालिङ्गितत्वं कारणत्वमित्यर्थः। अतिप्रसङ्गेन दूषयति नेति। एकस्मिन् घटे जायमानेऽतीतानागतवर्तमानमृदां मुज्जातीयत्वनियतत्वात्कारणत्वप्रसङ्ग इत्यर्थः। - Page 721, SwamI YogIndrAnanda]

4 also is invalid. Let us say at a particular moment, there is production of several ghaTa-vyakti. By this definition, the kAraNa of any particular ghaTa-vyakti

say ghaTa-vyakti-1 will have “नियत-तज्जातीयत्वे सति तत्पूर्वत्व” with respect to all ghaTa-vyakti. Thus, kAraNa of ghaTa-vyakti-1 will need to be admitted as kAraNa of ghaTa-vyakti-2 also. That is undesirable. Further, the samavAyi-kAraNa (clay) of ghaTa-vyakti-1, if destroyed, should lead to destruction of all ghaTa-vyakti. That is impossible. Hence, 4 cannot be accepted either.

5 is not acceptable either. सादेश्यत्व means समान-देश-वृत्ति-त्व. It basically means that if x is kAraNa, then kArya is mandatorily born from x and kArya should be in the same location where x is. However, ghaTa, which is born from kapAla, is located in kapAla through samavAya-sambandha. But kapAla is not located in kapAla, rather in its avayava through samavAya-sambandha. So, there is no samAna-deshatA. If you argue that ghaTa and kapAla are both in the same bhUtala through samyOga-sambandha and hence the definition is satisfied, then even that is refuted. Because guNa cannot have sAmAnAdhikaraNya through samyOga-sambandha. Thus, there is avyApti of lakshaNa in guNa.

Further, adrishTa is in AtmA as per NyAya. Thus, even those entities which are not located in the same desha can also have kArya-kAraNa-bhAva.

Thus, it is clear that no faultless lakshaNa can be provided for kAraNa-tva.

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